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A Delicate Balance: Defining the Line Between
Open Civil Proceedings and the Protection of
Children in the Online Digital Era
Courtney Retter and Shaheen Shariff*
He thought of the telescreen with its never-sleeping ear. They could spy
upon you night and day, but if you kept your head you could still outwit
them. [. . .] They could lay bare in the utmost detail everything that you had
done or said or thought; but the inner heart, whose workings were mysteri-
ous even to yourself, remained impregnable.
— George Orwell, 19841
On Thursday September 27, 2012, a few months after our paper was written,
the Supreme Court of Canada solidified the rights of children victimized by cyber-
bullying in the landmark decision of AB (Litigation Guardian of) v Bragg Commu-
nications Inc.1a The unanimous decision overturned the holding of the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal in part. The justices agreed with the contention that objectively
discernible harm would result to the15-year-old female plaintiff who was victim-
ized by online sexualized bullying, if she was forced to proceed in a legal action
against her cyber-perpetrators under her real name.
Writing on behalf of the court, Justice Abella held that, “. . .common sense
and the evidence show that young victims of sexualized bullying are particularly
vulnerable to the harms of revictimization upon publication, and since the right to
protection will disappear for most children without the further protection of ano-
nymity, the girl’s anonymous legal pursuit of the identity of her cyberbully should
be allowed.”1b Justice Abella argued, in other words, that while the open court
principle mandates that court proceedings presumptively remain open and accessi-
ble to the media and the public, there were sufficiently compelling interests in this
case, namely, the protection of children and their privacy, to warrant restrictions
on freedom of the press and openness.1c The Supreme Court did not grant, how-
ever, the child-plaintiff’s request for a publication ban of the allegedly defamatory
material contained in a fake Facebook profile in her name. Instead, the court held
that such a confidentiality order would be excessive, given that her name could no
longer be connected to the information.
* Courtney Retter, BCL/LLB, and Shaheen Shariff, PhD, Associate Professor McGill
University, Affiliate Scholar for the Centre for Internet and Society, Stanford Law
School.
1 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 2000) at Part 2, ch 7.
1a 2012 SCC 46 [AB v Bragg].
1b Ibid. at para 27.
1c Ibid. at para 13.
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INTRODUCTION
The open court principle is at least as old as the common law itself.2 With
references that can be traced back beyond inscrutable records, the principle has
always stood for the danger of conducting the administration of justice under a veil
of secrecy.3 Indeed, in addition to being a mechanism for scrutinizing judges, the
openness principle provided a way for local constituents to see truth organically
emerge.4 In fact, at a time when few places existed for community recreation and
entertainment, attending court and watching judicial procedures unfold constituted
a theatrical and engaging pastime for people in Elizabethan England: 
[The people] derived amusement from the technicalities of property lawsuits
and were impressed by political trials and public executions. [. . .] Law for
the Elizabethans took the place of politics and sports as a main interest.
Cases in court furnished a mirror in which the whole of English life from
high to low could be observed. [. . .] When the courts were in session, law-
yers, litigants, and observers swelled London’s population.5
In 2012, the courtroom scene remains largely unchanged. Judges still sit be-
hind a bench. Lawyers conduct their cases from their respective counsel table. Wit-
nesses recount their testimony in a witness box and observers listen from pews
behind the bar. What is radically different — though imperceptible — in today’s
courtroom, however, is the expanded participating audience of court proceedings.6
More specifically, while in theory court proceedings were open to the public, as a
practical matter they were closed to everyone but those who bothered to attend
court or who were literate and capable of following cases in newspapers.7 In to-
day’s digital era of information technology, however, an audience of infinite size
with unlimited access can tune into the courtroom world with the click of a button,
2 Paul Schabas, “What Happens at a Bail Hearing Anyway? The Supreme Court’s
Troubling Retreat from the Openness Principle in Toronto Star v Canada” (2011), 54
SCLR (2d) 197 at 199 [Schabas].
3 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555 at 565 (1980) (The openness prin-
ciple fundamentally contributed to the development of the English justice system: “In
the 17th century, Charles I’s use of the Star Chamber, which operated in private, was a
source of complaint in the years leading to the English Civil War,” Schabas, supra note
2 at 199) [Richmond Newspapers, Inc].
4 Ibid. (For instance, in the reports of the Eyre of Kent — a general court held in 1313-
1314 — the importance of public attendance in judicial proceedings is emphasized:
“[T]he King’s will was that all evil doers should be punished after their deserts, and
that justice should be ministered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the county by their attendance there
to lend him their aid in the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should be
both for the honour of the realm and for their own welfare,” Sir W Holdsworth, History
of English Law (London: Methuen, 1927) at 268) [Emphasis Added].
5 Daniel Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers?: Shakespeare’s Legal Appeal (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994) at 13 [Kornstein].
6 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Transparency and Public Confi-
dence — To the Better Administration of Justice” (2003) 8 Deakin Law Review 1 at 2
[McLachlin].
7 Ibid.
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thus creating new tensions and dilemmas for the open court principle and its under-
lying values as they inform judicial decisions. Karen Eltis highlights the potential
impact of digital media on judicial independence and the need to address the evolv-
ing tensions between privacy and open court principles: 
The “Digital Age,” and unfettered usage and access to digital information,
will have untold effects on core values of judicial independence, impartial-
ity and the delicate balance between privacy and the “open court” principle.
Technology — as well as the dramatically increased availability of informa-
tion of all kinds and quality — is distorting the judicial process and its out-
comes. It is of primary importance, therefore, to identify the broad issues
that emerge from the growing use of technology, and to provide a theoreti-
cal basis for adjudicating the ongoing tensions between privacy and trans-
parency in the judicial setting. Too often the judiciary pits privacy against
the “open court” principle and accepts a culturally narrow view of what
constitutes privacy and how it affects the judicial process [Emphasis
added].8
Our paper will examine the delicate balance between the open court principle
and the reasonable expectation of privacy of parties participating in the judicial
process, particularly when cyber-bullying cases are involved. Specifically, we will
delineate how, in a cyber-bullying context, the open court principle can damage the
lives and reputations of children seeking to hold their perpetrators accountable in
court.9 Traditionally, Canadian courts have pitted the right to privacy against the
right of the public to open courts, and, more often than not, privacy has yielded to
openness.10 We will argue, however, that the modern day reality of digital informa-
tion necessitates a more nuanced and complex understanding of the relationship
between openness and privacy.11 Accordingly, rather than conceptualize the two
principles as value competitors, privacy should instead be considered an ally of
8 Karen Eltis, “The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship Be-
tween Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context” (2011) McGill LJ 56(2) 1 at 7
[Eltis].
9 Shaheen Shariff & Leanna Johnny, “Cyber-Libel and Cyber-Bullying: Can Schools
Protect Student Reputations and Free-Expression in Virtual Environments?” (2007) 16
Educ & LJ 307 at 311-12 (While there is presently no consensus on the exact formula-
tion of the definition of cyber-bullying, the authors define the term as follows: “Cyber-
bullying consists of covert, psychological bullying, conveyed through electronic medi-
ums such as cell phones, web logs and websites, online chat rooms, “MUD” rooms
(multi-user domains where individuals take on different characters and false names)
and Xangas and myspace.com (online personal profiles where some adolescents create
lists of people they dislike). It is verbal (over the telephone or cell phone), or written
(flaming threats, racial, sexual or homophobic harassment) using the various mediums
available. Most cyber-bullying is covert, insidious and anonymous because perpetrators
are shielded by screen names”) [Shariff & Johnny].
10 Judges Technology Advisory Committee, Open Courts, Electronic Access to Court
Records, and Privacy (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 2003), online: Canadian Ju-
dicial Council <http://cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_techissues_Open
Courts_20030904_en.pdf> at 2 [JTAC].
11 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 9.
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openness in the judicial process.12 In order to demonstrate how the presumption of
openness can operate to produce unsatisfactory results that threaten both the pri-
vacy and safety of litigants in court, our paper will evaluate a particular strain of
jurisprudence as it relates to cyber-bullying.
To date, the open court principle has been first and foremost about courts.13
Put in another way, the open court principle concomitantly entails that: [1] the pub-
lic and the press have unrestricted access to courts of justice and are entitled to
attend and observe any hearing; [2] court records and documents are made availa-
ble for public examination; and [3] the reasons provided for judicial decisions are
public, and, therefore, subject to the scrutiny of legal parties, the reporting media,
the bar, academics and, most importantly, the public at large.14 Accordingly, the
open court principle is not about the parties seeking justice in a judicial venue; nor
is it uniquely premised on the rights of journalists reporting on court activities.15
What modern technology has essentially done, however, is blur and distort the orig-
inal parameters of the principle in such a way that openness can now operate to
prejudice rather than promote the integrity of the administration of justice.16 More
specifically, while a presumption of openness must continue to exist, unfettered
usage and access to digital judicial information can work to ensure, “rather than
prevent, the abuse of judicial power, can create unacceptable risks of a miscarriage
of justice, and can cause unnecessary harm to the safety and privacy of
individuals.”17
As this paper is being written, the Supreme Court of Canada [“SCC”] will
have heard an appeal regarding the rights of a child-plaintiff, victimized by online
bullying, to anonymously sue the creator of a fake Facebook profile in her name,
and obtain a publication ban on the statements she alleges to be defamatory con-
tained therein.18 In AB (Litigation Guardian of) v Bragg Communications Inc [“AB
v Bragg”], the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal denied the plaintiff’s application to
proceed in the defamation action under a pseudonym and to impose the publication
ban on the alleged defamatory materials.19 While the court acknowledged that chil-
dren are uniquely vulnerable in legal proceedings, it still held that: 
To initiate an action for defamation, one must present oneself and the al-
leged defamatory statements before a jury and in open court. To be able to
12 Eltis, supra note 8 at 1.
13 Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Open Courts and Privacy; Pri-
vacy Law in Canada” (Remarks at the Supreme Court of British Columbia Education
Seminar, 9 November 2011), online: http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/2011/sp-
d_20111109_e.asp [Stoddart].
14 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 2.
15 Stoddart, supra note 13.
16 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 11.
17 Peter A Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy
in an Age of Electronic Information” (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 307 at 308
[Winn].
18 AB (Litigation Guardian of) v Bragg Communications Inc, (13 October 2011) 2011
CarswellNS 694 (SCC).
19 2011 NSCA 26 [AB v Bragg].
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proceed with a defamation claim under a cloak of secrecy, strikes me as
being contrary to the quintessential features of defamation law.20
With respect, the above position fails to take into account or appreciate the
grave reality of cyber-bullying, online harassment, and its devastating conse-
quences for young people.21 While disclosing personal and embarrassing informa-
tion might be typical in cases where a plaintiff seeks damages for harm to reputa-
tion,22 it fails to capture the resonating essence of disparaging statements made
online — remarks, in other words, that are potentially accessible to an audience of
incalculable numbers, for an indefinite duration, and which magnify the harm every
single instance the information is viewed, retrieved, and saved.23
The problems of bullying and cyber-bullying are considered to be some of the
largest and most complicated issues in contemporary Canadian society.24 It is esti-
mated that there are over 252, 000 cases of bullying per month in Canadian high
schools.25 Furthermore, the ubiquity and broad reach of modern technology has
made bullying quicker, easier, more rampant, and crueler than ever before.26 The
negative short-term and long-term consequences of (cyber-)bullying for victims
range from loss of self-esteem to fear at school, anxiety, and, at the more extreme
end of this spectrum, substance abuse problems and ultimately, suicide.27 Despite
its increasing prevalence, only half of all victims are willing to report being bul-
lied;28 in fact, a majority of targeted children would only consider coming forward
with their stories if they could do so anonymously.29 In light of these observations,
it is disappointing that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal chose to pit openness
20 Ibid at para 80 [Emphasis Added].
21 Stoddart, supra note 13.
22 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at para 82.
23 A Wayne MacKay, on behalf of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyber-
bullying, Respectful and Responsible Relationships: There’s No App for That (Halifax:
Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyber-bullying, 2012) at 11 [There’s No App
for That].
24 Ibid at 4.
25 Ibid (as cited in a presentation by Bullying.org to the Senate Human Rights Committee
on Cyberbullying).
26 Ibid at 11.
27 Ibid at 10 (Suicide is the second leading cause of death for Canadian teenagers aged
15–19-years, Canadian Psychiatric Association (2012), online:
<http://publications.cpa- apc.org/browse/documents/20>. One in five Canadian teenag-
ers suffers from some kind of mental illness; despite this alarming statistic, less than
10% of teens who require mental health or drug and alcohol services will receive them
in Canada, “Mental Health Status and Prevalence of Mental Health Problems in Cana-
dian Children and Adolescents” (2010), online: <http://www.canadianschool
health.ca/page/The+Mental+Health+Status+%26+Prevalence+of+MH+Problems+in+
Canadian+Children+%26+Adolescents>).
28 Ibid at 10.
29 Shaheen Shariff & AH Churchill, Truths and Myths of Cyber-bullying: International
Perspectives on Stakeholder Responsibility and Children’s Safety (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, Inc, 2010) [Shariff & Churchill].
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against privacy without engaging in a more contextualized analysis of the compet-
ing interests at stake. Put in another way, openness “is not a matter of all or noth-
ing, one or the other. It is rather a matter of finding the right equilibrium, or bal-
ance, on a [. . .] case-by-case basis.”30
Using AB v Bragg as its centerpiece, our paper will argue that the open court
principle cannot act as the taken for granted starting point in cases involving child-
plaintiffs victimized by cyber-bullying.31 More specifically, we will demonstrate
that the underlying purpose of openness, namely, preserving the integrity of the
administration of justice, is defeated when litigants, particularly children, are [a]
deterred from accessing the courts, [b] scared that their privacy is endangered, and
[c] forced to confront outdated principles that have not properly evolved to reflect
the current status quo.32 We will begin by detailing how modern technology has
radically changed the relationship between open courts and privacy in the judicial
system. In particular, we will focus on how the shift from paper records to elec-
tronic judicial records has occurred without sufficient safeguards, resulting in the
celebration of the abstract philosophy of free-flowing judicial information at the
expense of the privacy and safety of litigants participating in the judicial process
(Section I).33 In order to understand why openness necessitates a more nuanced
analysis in the context of cyber-bullying, we will proceed with an evaluation of the
facts and reasoning provided in AB v Bragg. Furthermore, we will consider values
superordinate to openness in this case, namely, the protection of children, the right
to privacy, and access to justice (Section II). The paper will conclude by arguing
that litigious efforts against individual perpetrators of harm will not solve a com-
plex and multifaceted issue such as cyber-bullying; instead, children need to be
provided with ethical tools that will help them navigate the online world respon-
sibly (Section III).34
I. DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN OPENESS AND PRIVACY IN
THE DIGITAL ERA
Technology has irrevocably changed the way the Canadian judicial system
conducts business. At one time, in the not-so-distant past, access to judicial pro-
ceedings required some effort; it involved actually going to the courthouse to watch
a proceeding unfold, hunting through a plethora of specialized legal texts or waiting
in line to pay for copies of court documents.35 Today, by contrast, access to judicial
records is an effortless process that often involves nothing more arduous than a free
Google search of a legal concept and a party’s name. Indeed, an increasing number
30 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 10.
31 Eltis, supra note 8 at 19.
32 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 9-10.
33 Winn, supra note 17 at 315.
34 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 5.
35 Stoddart, supra note 13 (The Privacy Commissioner humourously noted in her speech,
“[s]ome of us [. . .] are old enough to remember trips to musty basement record rooms
not so long ago”).
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of courts provide remote electronic retrieval of docket information,36 post reasons
for judicial decisions electronically on court websites or through commercial pub-
lishers,37 and invite cameras into the courtroom, making legal drama a staple of the
nightly suppertime news.38 At its core, what differentiates public access to judicial
records today from in the past is that access is now paperless. Contemporary acces-
sibility, in other words, is premised on electronic court documents being available
in a cyber world where privacy can no longer be spatially bounded and where
courts are increasingly less capable of controlling how their own materials are
used.39 This conversion from paper to electronic records is irrefutably associated
with efficiency benefits for lawyers, judges, and ultimately, the populace;40 that
being said, paperless access still comes equipped with radical — and often misun-
derstood — implications for the judicial process and its governing principles.41
The following section will demonstrate how paperless access to judicial
records distorts the traditional balance between openness and competing principles
of interest. More specifically, the section will articulate why it is problematic to
apply the same rules designed for paper records to electronic ones, and how as-
sumptions of parity represent a serious misapprehension of the differences between
36 JTAC, supra note 10 at 22 (Docket information is “used to include documents prepared
manually by court staff or automatically by data entered into a computer such as a
listing of court records in a court file.” For instance, the SCC website, www.scc-
csc.gc.ca, includes an online tracking system which allows users to obtain a list of all
of the documents filed, the party responsible for filing them, and the date and a descrip-
tion of events which have occurred in that court).
37 Ibid at 22 (In some jurisdictions, the court provides an electronic version of judgments
to the Canadian Legal Information Institute [“CanLII”] (www.canlii.org). Not all judi-
cial decisions are available online and there is inconsistency in the availability of rea-
sons for decisions in family law cases. For instance, the Court of Queen’s Bench in
Alberta stopped posting family law cases to its court website and stopped sending elec-
tronic versions to CANLII).
38 McLachlin, supra note 6.
39 Eltis, supra note 8 at 14–16 (For instance, many court documents contain personal
information, including social security numbers, bank accounts, medical records, trade
secrets, and criminal records. Kristen M Blankley, “Are Public Records Too Public?
Why Personally Identifying Information Should Be Removed from Both Online and
Print Versions of Court Documents” (2004) 65 Ohio St. L.J. 413 at 414 [Blankley].
“Courts must ensure that those who encounter the legal system — voluntarily as well
as involuntarily — do not face exploitation of their personal information by commer-
cial information brokers or become the victims of cyber-criminals or electronic peeping
toms,” Winn, supra note 17 at 318).
40 Winn, supra note 17 at 314 (For instance, in the US, federal electronic filing systems
offer the following benefits: “24-hour access to case files over the Internet, ability to
file pleadings electronically with the court, automatic e-mail notice of case activity,
ability to download and print up-to-date documents directly from the court system, no
waiting in line, expanded search and reporting capacities, the elimination of the cost of
expensive courier services, and an overall reduction in the physical storage space needs
of the courts”).
41 Ibid.
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paper and electronic records.42 In particular, we will consider the following three
broad impacts of paperless records on privacy: [a] breadth of access; [b] perma-
nence of records; and [c] outdated legal protections.43
(a) Breadth of Access
The first broad impact of paperless records on privacy refers to the extent to
which documents are now subject to unlimited, unparalleled, and unchecked dis-
semination.44 Prior to the advent of modern digital technologies, court documents,
while technically public, were still private in nature because they reflected what has
come to be known as the doctrine of practical obscurity.45 In the world of paper-
based judicial records, personal information was accessible to the public in the
sense that anyone with a desire to access a court document could view it; the costs
of retrieval, however, limited access as a practical matter.46 Put in another way,
only individuals with a strong personal interest in a particular court matter would
take the necessary amount of time required out of their day to travel to the local
courthouse, wait in line at the clerk’s office, fill out the requisite paperwork, and
pay the copying costs.47 Electronic court documents, by contrast, are universally
accessible and virtually cost-free. Once a court record is published online, “com-
puterized compilers can search, aggregate, and combine the information with infor-
mation from many other public filings to create a profile of a specific individual in
a matter of minutes, at minimal cost.”48 In short, paper documents operated in fa-
vour of privacy by shielding litigants from the harm that could potentially result
from indiscriminate access to and use of information contained in a document con-
nected with a court proceeding.49
Case examples are the best way of illustrating the extent to which openness is
distorted by the breadth of access of paperless court documents. In JL v AN
[“JL”],50 for instance, a Quebec woman sued a former sexual partner for damages
after being infected with a sexually transmitted disease for which that partner had
failed to disclose his carrier status. In consequence of the disturbing and embarrass-
42 Ibid at 315.
43 Chantal Bernier, Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “The Adjudicative Pro-
cess in the Internet Age: A New Equation for Privacy and Openness” (Presentation at
the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice National Roundtable, 28 May
2010), online: <http://29717.vws.primus.ca/speech/2010/sp-d_20100528_cb_e.cfm>
[Bernier].
44 Eltis, supra note 8 at 15.
45 This doctrine was first articulated in United States Dep’t of Justice v Reporters Comm
for Freedom of the Press, 489 US 749 , 762, 780 (1989).
46 Winn, supra note 17 at 316.
47 Blankley, supra note 39 at 417.
48 Winn, supra note 17 at 316 (“Information in many different locations can be combined
and aggregated in ways that previously were impossible, permitting entirely new uses
of the information that could never have been intended before”).
49 Ibid at 320.
50 [2007] RJQ 1998 (Sup Ct) (see also Telbani v Canada (Procureur général), 2008 CF
1318; X v Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, [1992] RJQ 2735 (CA)) [JL].
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ing nature of the sexual and medical details involved in the case, the plaintiff asked
the court to exercise its discretionary power and redact sensitive information.51 The
court, however, refused to grant the plaintiff a publication ban on the grounds that
the issues at bar were not family law related; rather, they were private law matters
not sufficiently exceptional to justify encroaching on the open court principle.52
Interestingly, legal databases such as SOQUIQ voluntarily agreed to redact the
disturbing sexual and medical details provided in J.L. even though they were at
liberty to publish them.53 Irrespective of this fact, once information is made availa-
ble online redaction is virtually impossible and outside the control of the courts.54
The co-existence of a partially redacted court file with an official and complete
court decision does nothing to assuage the impact of egregious intimate facts float-
ing around online in infamy. Furthermore, the identities of anonymous parties can
still be ascertained in Quebec by matching the action number on the reasons for
decision with the action number provided on www.azimut.soquij.qc.ca, the official
website of the SOQUIQ legal database.55 Anyone with access to a computer, con-
sequently, is a click away from accessing the [1] names, and [2] medical and sexual
information disclosed by parties involved in cases such as JL.
(b) Permanence of Records
The second broad impact of paperless records on privacy reflects the temporal
and spatial characteristics that differentiate the lifespan of a paper document from
an electronic one. Like humans, paper records are organic.56 More specifically,
both humans and paper records experience a natural evolution of decay and
change.57 With the passing of time, paper-based documents accumulate and grow
old, thus ensuring the consistent disposal of materials to make room for new docu-
ments.58 Electronic records, on the other hand, are inorganic; they never grow old,
nor do they get relocated to warehouses or physically get destroyed.59 Instead, de-
fying any commonsense understanding of the progressive degeneration of docu-
51 Eltis, supra note 8 at 22.
52 JL, supra note 50 (Legislation attempts to exclude certain subject matters from the
general principle of openness. For instance, in Quebec, all family law cases uniformly
have initials in the style of cause. Specifically, section 815.4 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure states: “No information that would allow the identification of a party to a pro-
ceeding or of a child whose interest is at stake in a proceeding may be published or
broadcast unless the court or the law authorizes it or unless that publication or broad-
cast is necessary to permit the application of an Act or a regulation. Furthermore, the
judge may, in a special case, prohibit or restrict, for such time and on such conditions
as he may deem fair and reasonable, the publication or broadcast of information per-
taining to a sitting of the court,” RSQ, ch C-25 [Emphasis Added]).
53 Eltis, supra note 8 at 22.
54 Ibid.
55 JTAC, supra note 10 at 23.
56 Winn, supra note 17 at 316.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid at 317.
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ments over time, paperless records have the capacity to be stored for long periods
of time. Although digital data degrade over time, they are more likely to be re-
trieved and resurface when stored in more than one computer hard-drive, server or
data base.60 Given the possible indefinite duration of their existence, paperless doc-
uments challenge one of the foundational principles of court accessibility. Specifi-
cally, electronic records undermine a court’s ability to control its own documents.61
In MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), the SCC held that, at every
stage of the judicial process, courts have a supervisory and protecting power over
their own records.62 Furthermore, it is the authoring judge — and not the pub-
lisher — who is ultimately responsible for the contents of a judgment.63 When doc-
uments are no longer confined to their physical incarnation, however, it is substan-
tially harder to manage, firstly, who is viewing a record, and secondly, the purpose
for which a record’s content is being used.64 Once a record is available online, it
can be republished quickly and easily and reproduced infinitely with no mechanism
for regulating how that document is subsequently modified or where it ends up in
cyberspace.65 In the virtual realm, in other words, the concepts of both document
control and authorship are disturbingly skewed: 
Once a [document] enters cyberspace, millions of people worldwide can
gain access to it. Even if the [document] is posted in [an online] forum fre-
quented by only a handful of people, any one of them can republish the
[document] by printing it or, as is more likely by forwarding it instantly to a
different [. . .] [online] forum. And if the [document’s content] is suffi-
60 Ibid.
61 Eltis, supra note 8 at 15.
62 MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1982] 1 SCR 175 at 189 [MacIntyre].
63 See Kate Welsh, “Court Records Access in Canada”(Presentation delivered at the 6th
Conference on Privacy and Public Access to Court Records, Williamsburg, 6-7 No-
vember 2008) at 15, online: The Center for Legal and Court Technology <pri-
vacy.legaltechcenter.net/privacy/Privacy%20Documents/Court%20Records%20Access
%20in%20Canada.ppt>, citing MacIntyre, supra note 62.
64 Winn, supra note 17 at 317 (The author argues that online access has a dark side. For
instance, “[i]dentity theft is now reaching epidemic proportions and has left millions of
innocent victims little, if any, means of redress. In health care, the electronic revolution
has created new opportunities for advances in medicine, but it also has begun to under-
mine the relationship of trust between physician and patient”).
65 Shariff & Johnny, supra note 9 at 318 (The world is no longer dominated by paper:
“The world produces between 1 and 2 exabytes of unique information per year, which
is roughly 250 megabytes for every man, woman, and child on earth. An exabyte is a
billion gigabytes[.] [. . .] Printed documents of all kinds comprise only .003% of the
total. Magnetic storage is by far the largest medium for storing information and is the
most rapidly growing with shipped hard drive capacity doubling every year. Magnetic
storage is rapidly becoming the universal medium for information storage.” Also see
William A Fenwick & Robert D Brownstone, “Electronic Filing: What Is It? What Are
Its Implications?” (2002) 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 181 at 182 [Em-
phasis Added]).
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ciently provocative, it may be republished again and again.66
The Israeli case of Doe v Doe (Ploni v Almoni) [“Ploni”]67 is an unparalleled
illustration of how judicial dominion over court records is eroded online.68 In
Ploni, a man sued an Internet dating website after the company refused to delete
postings made by a former lover who usurped the plaintiff’s online identity — a
pseudonym deliberately chosen to keep his sexual orientation a secret — in order to
disclose his true identity and fabricate lies regarding his HIV status. Following
standard protocol, the court system automatically posted the pleadings at bar, in-
cluding the maligned and damaging details regarding the plaintiff’s orientation,
preferred sexual acts, and overall health that initiated the suit in the first place.69
While the judge subsequently ordered that a redacted version be posted online ex-
cluding the inflammatory details, the original copy of the pleadings were left float-
ing around in the abyss of cyberspace, never to be located or effectively removed.70
The circumstances in Ploni are unfortunately not exceptional. Lawyers and judges
alike are slowly evolving to recognize the possible ramifications of including sensi-
tive information in court documents intended for online publication; at a minimum,
legal actors’ reaction time is remarkably slower than the pace at which documents
can be posted online and distributed globally.71
(c) Outdated Legal Protections
Courts are held to protect the discretionary privacy rights of parties participat-
ing in the judicial process even when that duty is at odds with accessibility.72 Ac-
cordingly, the third broad impact of paperless records on privacy reflects the inade-
quacy of traditional mechanisms used to limit openness in warranted cases.73 More
specifically, electronic records challenge the efficacy of existing methods for seal-
ing files and anonymization, including requests for publication bans, sealing orders,
and applications to use a pseudonym or initials in the style of cause of a proceed-
ing.74 Indeed, legal tests articulated by the courts for many of the above discretion-
66 LB Lidsky, “Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace” (2000) 49
Duke LJ 855 at 862–865 [Lidsky].
67 Doe v Doe (Ploni v Almoni) (2006), Tel Aviv Magistrate Court 06/17485.
68 Eltis, supra note 8 at 15.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. (“Of course counsel’s tardy realization that the statement of claim would be
posted online in accordance with the court’s standard practice was presumably at least
partially to blame for the lamentable result”).
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid at 21.
73 Eltis, supra note 8 at 19 (Circumstances which warrant an encroachment on the pre-
sumption of openness include, but are not limited to, “young offenders, family matters,
the protection of innocent third parties, interim publication bans, and in some cases,
confidential commercial information.”)
74 JTAC, supra note 10 at 35 (Succinctly, a sealing order is an order by which a document
filed in a civil proceeding is treated as confidential and does not form part of the public
record; a publication ban, by contrast, is an order to restrict or ban publication of cer-
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ary orders preceded the Internet age and the ubiquity of electronic media. The digi-
tal era of information technology has transformed the world so rapidly that there
has been an insufficient amount of time to develop case law that appropriately takes
the differences between electronic and paper records into account, thus reconfigur-
ing the balance between openness and the protection of privacy.75 Courts, in other
words, are left with no other alternative but to apply legal rules to factual realities
that no longer adequately cover or reflect the ways in which privacy can be chal-
lenged today.76
For the purposes of our paper, the questionable utility of publication bans in
the era of Internet technology is particularly instructive. Indeed, while in the past
publication bans effectively shielded the protected content of an order both within
and outside the territorial scope of its application,77 today’s publication bans are
governed by a new rule of thumb, namely, the bigger the case, the more futile the
ban.78 Court ordered publication bans are strictly enforceable within Canadian bor-
ders. When a case attracts international attention, however, it is increasingly diffi-
cult to prevent the dissemination of information protected under a ban from being
published abroad. For instance, the value of a ban is seriously undermined when a
blogger or news outlet across the U.S. border can publish details of a proceeding
revealed in open court without sanction.79 Furthermore, as stated earlier in our pa-
per, it is virtually impossible to supervise how information is used and where it is
posted online once it becomes available. In short, in many instances a publication
ban is nothing short of a license for anyone with Internet connection to distort facts
and participate in an online circus of speculation regarding the outcome of a case
and its proceedings.80
tain information during a proceeding. This order could prevent the media from report-
ing on certain issues or the proceeding.)
75 Winn, supra note 17 at 319.
76 Ibid at 315.
77 Bernier, supra note 43.
78 Kirk Makin, “Internet Wreaks Havoc on Publication Bans” (5 April 2005) The Globe
and Mail, online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
technology/article876596.ece>.
79 Ibid. (For instance, “[a] ban on testimony at the Commission of Inquiry into the Spon-
sorship Program and Advertising Activities [“Gomery inquiry”] had barely been issued
[. . .] before it was massively breached [. . .] by U.S. bloggers whose websites are eas-
ily accessible to Canadians.” The Gomery inquiry was appointed by Paul Martin’s gov-
ernment on February 19th, 2004. Justice John Gomery of the Superior Court of Quebec
was the sole commissioner appointed to investigate the misuse of funds by the federal
sponsorship program).
80 Globe Editorial, “This Ban Goes Too Far” (30 April 2010) The Globe and Mail, online:
The Globe and Mail http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/editorials/this-
ban-goes-too-far/article1553384/ (The SCC itself has acknowledged that blog postings
and other online media are “potentially more ephemeral and more ubiquitous than
traditional print media,” Grant v Torstar Corp, [2009] 3 SCR 640 at para 97 [Grant]).
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(d) Summary Analysis
In their 2003 report, Open Courts, Electronic Access to Court Records, and
Privacy [“Report”], the Judges Technology Advisory Committee [“JTAC”] re-
ported the following conclusions to the Canadian Judicial Council on the relation-
ship between privacy and openness in the modern digital era:
1. The right of the public to open courts is an important constitutional
rule.
2. The right of an individual to privacy is a fundamental value.
3. The right to open courts generally outweighs the right to privacy.81
It is not an exaggeration to state that the legal landscape under consideration
nine years ago in the JTAC Report is radically different from the present Canadian
status quo. For starters, in 2004, a year after the Report’s publication, social
networking site Facebook was launched and irreversibly changed the way Canadi-
ans communicate. In 2012, there are reported to be 18 million Canadians on
Facebook — a statistic representing more than half of the country’s population.82
Furthermore, blogging websites with the exclusive purpose of tracking Canadian
cases are now commonplace;83 the Canadian Legal Information Institute publishes
judicial decisions with the option of sharing holdings automatically via Twitter or
Linkedin;84 and evidence from text messages, voicemail, and social media in gen-
eral, are increasingly being introduced as exhibits in court.85 In short, while both
the right of the public to open courts and to individual privacy remain important
fundamental principles, judicial assessments which presumptively place more
weight on openness without engaging in a more nuanced and contextual analysis of
the competing values at stake are out of touch with the reality of the online judicial
81 JTAC, supra note 10 at 18 [Emphasis Added].
82 Vito Pilieci, “Is Social Media Harming our Mental Health, Researchers Wonder?” (25
March 2012) National Post, online: nationalpost.com <http://news.nationalpost.com/
2012/03/25/is-social-media-harming-our-mental-health-researchers-wonder/> (“More
than 12 million [Canadians] visit the site daily. On a per-capita basis, Canada has the
highest number of Facebook users in the world”).
83 See, for instance, Slaw, Canada’s online legal magazine (www.slaw.ca), and Law-
blogs.ca, an open directory of Canadian blogging lawyers, law librarians, marketers, IT
professionals and paralegals (http://www.lawblogs.ca).




85 See, for instance, Kathryn R Brown, “The Risks of Taking Facebook at Face Value:
Why the Psychology of Social Networking Should Influence the Evidentiary Relevance
of Facebook Photographers” (2012) 14 Vand J Ent & Tech L 357 at 360 (“The average
Facebook user creates ninety pieces of content each month, representing a potential
gold mine for lawyers seeking information about their clients or adversaries. In recent
years, US and Canadian courts have grappled with questions about the discoverability
and admissibility of Facebook content in litigation. For example, criminal prosecutors
have sought to prove a defendant’s lack of remorse by presenting Facebook photo-
graphs that portray the defendant as mocking the law”).
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realm;86 in fact, such assessments can threaten, rather than preserve, the integrity of
the administration of justice.87
Section I of our paper demonstrated the extent to which electronic records
have shifted the balance away from privacy. Although electronic court records and
their wide dissemination facilitate public access to case law, the balance away from
privacy complicates, if not compromises, the accountability of judges in the judicial
process.88 Rather than furthering the principle of open courts, paperless documents
have resulted in transaction costs ranging from excessive infringements on privacy
to a diluted capacity on behalf of the courts to supervise their own materials.89
These costs are not trivial. Unlimited access to court records online will not in-
crease public respect for the Canadian judicial system. Without the appropriate
safeguards, it will instead erode the faith and confidence traditionally enjoyed by
the courts:90
In addition to the embarrassment it can generate, free-for-all admission to
court records online significantly facilitates witness — litigant bullying, and
may even nourish an intimidation industry. This is certainly not to suggest
that litigants could not be embarrassed, or that witnesses could not be
“reached” prior to the Internet age; it is merely that these pre-existing diffi-
culties are exponentially worsened by the indiscriminate posting of court
records online, due to the nature of the networked environment.91
In the section that follows, we will concretely examine how judicial analyses
that presumptively prioritize openness over privacy can exponentially worsen the
degree of harm experienced by a litigant in court. More specifically, using AB v
Bragg as our anchor, we will consider the ramifications of a court pitting the princi-
ple of open courts against privacy to the detriment of a child-plaintiff victimized by
cyber-bullying, thus failing to reconcile these primordial objectives in a fair and
principled way.92 The section will begin by providing a brief description of the
facts and judicial history of AB v Bragg. It will follow by considering the values
superordinate to openness in this case, namely, [1] the protection of children, [2]
the right to privacy, and [3] access to justice.93
II. DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN OPEN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
AND THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN AB v BRAGG
For sixteen years, the Dagenais/Mentuck test has repeatedly served as the ba-
rometer for gauging when and how courts exercise their discretion of limiting the
86 McLachlin, supra note 6.
87 Eltis, supra note 8 at 19.
88 Winn, supra note 17 at 315.
89 Eltis, supra note 8 at 14.
90 Winn, supra note 17 at 315.
91 Eltis, supra note 8 at 13.
92 McLachlin, supra note 6.
93 AB (Litigation Guardian of) v Bragg Communications Inc (10 May 2012), Ottawa
34240 (SCC) (Factum of the Appellant at paras 69–95) [Factum of the Appellant].
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principle of open courts in favour of values of superordinate importance.94 The test,
first articulated in Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp,95 and subsequently
modified in R v Mentuck,96 mandates that publication bans — and other discretion-
ary orders which encroach on the public’s right to know what happens in court —
should only be ordered when:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the
proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures
will not prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including
the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair
and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.97
The above test is regarded as a flexible and contextual endeavor.98 In fact, the
SCC has explicitly condemned judicial interpretations of the test that endorse a
hierarchical approach to rights, presumptively placing some principles over others
when developing the common law and construing sections of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms [“Charter”].99 When the protected rights of two individuals
come into conflict, in other words, as is often the case when discretionary orders
are granted, Charter principles necessitate a balanced analysis that fully appreciates
the importance of both sets of rights.100
AB v Bragg is an example of a case whereby two sets of values, namely, [1]
the right of the press to report on court proceedings, and [2] the protection of chil-
dren, collide and require that a court engage in a principled and fair analysis of the
competing values at stake.101 As will be discussed below, however, we will ad-
vance the argument that the court failed to adequately weigh the principles engaged
under the Dagenais/Mentuck test. Specifically, we will demonstrate why the imper-
atives to grant the child-plaintiff’s request in this case for anonymity and a partial
publication ban are of superordinate importance than the public’s unrestricted ac-
94 Schabas, supra 2 at 205.
95 [1994] SCJ No 104 [Dagenais].
96 [2001] SCJ No 73 [Mentuck].
97 Ibid at para 32.
98 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, [2005] SCJ No 41, ¶31.
99 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (In Edmonton Journal v Alberta
(Attorney General), [1989] SCJ No 124 the SCC explicitly recognized the constitu-
tional dimensions of the principle of openness under the Charter. Specifically, the court
recognized that openness is a component of freedom of expression protected by section
2(b) of the Charter: “[t]he more complex society becomes, the more important becomes
the function of the courts. As a result of their significance, the courts must be open to
public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation by the public. [. . .] The press
must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact,
seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny,” at paras 5, 9)
[Charter].
100 Dagenais, supra note 95 at para 72.
101 AB v Bragg, supra note 19.
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cess to the proceedings at bar. In particular, we will delineate how the public’s
interest in open courts is not ultimately threatened by suppressing the plaintiff’s
identity and identifying details; rather, such facts are but a “sliver of information”
withheld from the public and the press and represent a minimal intrusion on the
principles of open courts and freedom of expression.102
(a) The Facts
At the heart of this case lies the “tension between a young person’s claim to
privacy following the posting of derogatory information on the social networking
website, Facebook, and the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of the press
in Canada, when viewed in the context of a planned action for defamation.”103
More specifically, after AB, a fifteen-year old girl, discovered the creation of a fake
Facebook profile her in name that included scandalous sexual commentary of a
private and intimate nature [“Fake Profile”], she looked to the courts to help her in
identifying the anonymous cyber-perpetrator(s).104 With Facebook’s cooperation,
AB and her litigation guardian/father, CD, were provided with the Eastlink internet
protocol [“IP”] address associated with the account in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.105
While the Fake Profile was immediately removed from Facebook’s site after the
company became cognizant of the situation, AB applied in Chambers for an order
requiring Eastlink to disclose the identity of the person who authored the alleged
defamatory statements.106 AB said she planned to unmask the identity of the anon-
ymous poster.107 In an effort to protect her reputation and limit the possible harm
resulting from the defamatory publication, AB sought [1] a partial publication ban
of the words contained in the Fake Profile, and [2] an order that would allow her to
advance the litigation under pseudonymous initials.108
After AB’s request for a publication ban and anonymity order were published
on the Nova Scotia Publication Ban Media Advisory Web Site as an automated
advisory, the Halifax Herald Limited [“Herald”] and Global Television sought
leave to intervene; both media outlets advised the court that they opposed AB’s two
claims for relief which infringed upon on their Charter-guaranteed rights and free-
doms.109 Nancy Rubin, who challenged the bans on behalf of the Herald, argued
that anonymity is anathema to a defamation action: “If you have a reputation, you
102 N (F), Re, [2000] 1 SCR 880, ¶12.
103 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at para 1.
104 Ibid at para 7 (The profile additionally included a photograph of AB, a modified ver-
sion of her name, and commentary related to AB’s physical appearance and weight).
105 Ibid at para 11 (Bragg Communications Limited owns Eastlink; it is a Canadian cable
television and telecommunications company and provider of Internet and entertainment
services in Atlantic Canada).
106 Ibid at para 10 (The profile was saved and forwarded to AB by at least one person. AB
argues that all those who have seen it will immediately be able to identify her as AB if
it is republished, Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 22).
107 Ibid at para 12.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid at para 14.
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have to vindicate it publicly. [. . .] And when you’re dealing with publication bans
in the context of the open-court principle, and freedom of the press, there is an
evidentiary burden [to be satisfied].”110 Put in another way, speculation about hurt
feelings is a natural byproduct of a judicial system founded on the open court prin-
ciple and insufficiently justifies encroaching on that fundamental value.111
(b) Trial Decision
Justice LeBlanc, the motions judge at trial, ordered Eastlink to disclose the
identity of the owner of the IP address behind the Fake Profile and held that such
an order was the only way AB could hope to determine who created the account; he
refused, however, AB’s separate requests for confidentiality protections.112 After
applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test to the facts at bar, Justice LeBlanc concluded
that AB could neither proceed by pseudonymous initials, nor would the court order
a partial publication ban on any of the information published in the Fake Profile;
this decision was ultimately grounded on the lack of affidavit evidence filed by AB
and CD corroborating claims that AB would suffer future harm if she was required
to reveal her identity and the alleged defamatory statements contained in the Fake
Profile: 
I am satisfied that a publication ban would not be justified in the circum-
stances. [. . .] The affidavit filed by the guardian and by counsel on behalf of
A.B. does not make any reference to the effect, whether physical, psycholog-
ical, emotional or mental that this Facebook profile has had on the
applicant.113
The resulting effect of Justice Leblanc’s decision is that AB is entitled to re-
ceive information from Eastlink that would help her in identifying the author(s) of
the alleged defamatory statements published in the Fake Profile. The catch-22 of
this conclusion, however, is that the receipt of Eastlink’s information concomi-
tantly entails that AB disclose her full name in court and grant access to the media
to report on and publish the content of the alleged defamatory statements made
about her in the Fake Profile. Justice Leblanc was urged to take judicial notice of
harm to AB, given her age, her inherent vulnerability and the nature of the Fake
Profile; however, he refused to do so.114 AB appealed Justice Leblanc’s decision
110 Dean Jobb, “No Publication Ban for 15-year-old in Facebook Defamation Claim” (25
March 2011) The Lawyers Weekly, online: The Lawyers Weekly
<http://www.lawyersweekly-digital.com/lawyersweekly/3043?pg=15#pg15>.
111 Ibid.
112 AB (Litigation Guardian of) v Bragg Communications Inc (2010), 2010 NSSC 215
(Justice LeBlanc, sitting in Chambers, delivered his decision orally in May 2010
[Chambers Decision]; the decision was reduced to written reasons in June 2010. Justice
LeBlanc additionally held that while the Charter values of freedom of expression and
privacy came into play in relation to the anonymous cyber-perpetrator(s), the “public
interest in disclosing the information identifying the Fake Profile creator prevailed,”
Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 25).
113 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 27 (as quoted in Chambers Decision,
Appellant’s Record at 37) [Emphasis Added].
114 Ibid at paras 28-29.
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on the ground that he erred by failing to take into account the special vulnerability
of children, and by ignoring the obvious and serious risk of harm that AB would
suffer if forced to disclose her identity.115
(c) Court of Appeal Decision
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld Justice LeBlanc’s refusal to grant
AB two discrete orders for confidentiality protection.116 The court’s determination
was largely premised on the following three arguments: [1] AB is “not so marked
by disability as to trigger the court’s obligation to protect her through the exercise
of parens patriae;”117 [2] the constitutional principles of freedom of the press and
open courts trump the need to protect AB’s privacy because she insufficiently
demonstrated by affidavit evidence that harm would result in the absence of the
court granting her a partial publication ban and permission to advance the litigation
anonymously;118 and [3] defamation actions, by definition, require that plaintiffs
present themselves and the alleged defamatory statements before a jury and in open
court.119
(i) Parens Patriae
The first argument is premised on the inherent discretion of Canadian courts to
exercise their parens patriae jurisdiction — a common law duty vested in judges
out of a necessity to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves,
including children.120 For instance, in R v Sharpe, the SCC concluded that Cana-
dian courts have long shown an interest in protecting the rights and interests of
children.121 Indeed, given their physical, mental and emotional immaturity, chil-
dren comprise one of the most vulnerable groups in Canadian society and are thus
deserving of a heightened form of protection.122
In AB v Bragg, however, Justice Saunders refused to exercise the court’s dis-
cretionary power to intervene and protect AB. This refusal was grounded in part on
115 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at para 16.
116 Ibid at para 3.
117 Ibid at para 59.
118 Ibid at para 94.
119 Ibid at para 80.
120 Eve, Re, [1986] 2 SCR 388 at paras 72–75 (Justice LaForest provides a detailed history
of the genesis and scope of parens patriae jurisdiction: “From the earliest time, the
sovereign, as parens patriae, was vested with the care of the mentally incompetent.
This right and duty, as Lord Eldon noted in Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort [. . .] is
founded on the obvious necessity that the law should place somewhere the care of
persons who are not able to take care of themselves. In early England, the parens pa-
triae jurisdiction was confined to mental incompetents, but its rationale is obviously
applicable to children and, following the transfer of that jurisdiction to the Lord Chan-
cellor in the seventeenth century, he extended it to children under wardship, and it is in
this context that the bulk of the modern cases on the subject arise”) [Eve, Re].
121 R v Sharpe, [2001] 1 SCR 45 [Sharpe].
122 Ibid at paras 170–174.
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the fact that, firstly, AB never invited the motions judge to exercise his jurisdiction
during the Chambers hearing,123 and secondly, AB’s initial application was filed in
accordance with the rules of civil procedure — an area of the law, in other words,
void of legislative gaps that trigger the need to exercise the common law doctrine.
Justice Saunders stated that, in his opinion, “Civil Procedure Rules provide a com-
prehensive and complete framework in which the issues in this case may be re-
solved.”124 In short, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal appears to be of the position
that, unless invited to do so, the court does not need to exercise its discretionary
power to protect children, a group of individuals already characterized in Canadian
law as inherently vulnerable, when there is a legislative regime already in place to
protect minors such as AB.125
To ignore the inherent vulnerability of a 15-year-old girl is completely incon-
gruent with Canadian jurisprudence dealing with the court’s discretionary power to
exercise its jurisdiction in favour of children. Time and time again, the common
law, premised on the parens patriae jurisdiction, has acknowledged the power of
state institutions to intervene to protect at-risk children.126 Furthermore, the in-
stances under which the jurisdiction can be exercised to protect children are never
closed; rather, as societal conditions change and vulnerable populations confront
new and unforeseen challenges, courts have broadened the scope of parens patriae
to adequately cover the new legal landscape.127 Given the insidious and increas-
ingly pervasive nature of cyber-bullying today among Canadian youth, it is not a
far stretch to presume that cases such as AB v Bragg — while novel at their core —
are appropriately within the scope of the jurisdiction’s reach.128
(ii) Insufficient Affidavit Evidence
The second argument is premised on the proper application of the
Dagenais/Mentuck test. More specifically, after interpreting the first prong of the
test, namely, that confidentiality orders should only be granted when the risk of
harm is “real, substantial, and well-grounded in the evidence,”129 Justice Saunders
concluded that AB’s failure to produce any evidence of harm or risk of harm were
fatal to both confidentiality protection requests.130 In the absence of such convinc-
ing evidence, the court argued that it could not logically limit the fundamental con-
123 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at para 55.
124 Ibid at paras 60-61.
125 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 76.
126 Sharpe, supra note 121 at para 174.
127 Eve, Re, supra note 120.
128 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 74.
129 Mentuck, supra note 96 at para 34 [Emphasis Added].
130 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at paras 91–94 (Justice Saunders argued that, “[i]t should
have been a relatively easy thing for the appellant to produce evidence showing harm.
A parent, a relative, a teacher, a nurse, or a doctor might easily have sworn an affidavit
which would document the noticeable changes perceived in AB thereby offering evi-
dence of past harm, which would then assist the court in predicting future harm or, at
least, evaluating the risk of harm”).
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stitutional values of freedom of the press and open courts. In addition, it was held
that AB’s age did not establish any kind of special vulnerability that would justify
the court weighing her interests above the constitutional rights of others: “While
context is always important, AB’s age [is] simply a circumstance, among many
other factors, for the judge to take into account when performing the necessary
analysis to decide whether any kind of confidentiality order ought to be
granted.”131
Accordingly, after a formalistic application of the Dagenais/Mentuck test’s
first prong, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal disregarded the easily acceptable and
logical conclusion that AB, a victim of cyber-bullying, would be exposed to addi-
tional harm if forced to forever link her identity with the maligned Fake Profile.132
Indeed, despite the fact that [1] Canadian courts have previously determined that a
risk that “children could be subjected to undue stress is sufficient to restrict the
publication of disputes involving [. . .] children,”133 and [2] presiding judges can
make determinations of the interests at play without evidentiary material being pre-
sented by a party,134 the court refused to grant AB’s confidentiality orders in the
absence of evidence corroborating the future harm that might occur should her ano-
nymity not be protected. Importantly, case law exists whereby publication bans
were denied on the basis that no affidavit of harm was filed before the court; just as
importantly, however, none of those said cases involved children.135
(iii) The Nature of Defamation Actions
The third argument is premised on the quintessential features of defamation
law. More specifically, given that defamation is a claim that one’s reputation has
been lowered in the eyes of the public, it is a logical extension of that claim that in
order to vindicate one’s reputation one must do so in open court by identifying
one’s name and the statements which hurt you.136 Put in another way, the pursuit of
a defamation action under pseudonymous initials, and with a ban of the alleged
disparaging statements, is counterintuitive and challenges the very spirit of this
field of law.137 Consequently, as soon as AB chose to “avail herself of the court
process in the pursuit of damages for defamation, she submitted to whatever public
scrutiny attaches to civil litigation and must accept the attendant diminished expec-
tation of privacy.”138 In fact, it was submitted by Justice Saunders that by coming
forward and disclosing her identity, AB would be celebrated for her courage in
defending her good name and weeding out on-line perpetrators who hide in the
bushes, behind nameless IP addresses.139
131 Ibid at para 68.
132 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 6.
133 Radtke v Gibb, 2009 SKQB 440, ¶36.
134 R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2010 ONCA 726.
135 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 66.
136 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at para 80.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid at para 102.
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With respect, the above position reflects a misapprehension of the information
already available to the public in this case. Succinctly, the public is cognizant of the
following information: [1] AB is a victim of cyber-bullying; [2] the cyber-bullying
occurred on Facebook after a fake profile was created in AB’s name by an anony-
mous cyber-perpetrator; [3] the Fake Profile contained disparaging statements that
were sexual and allegedly defamatory in nature; [4] AB can only identify her
cyber-perpetrator if Eastlink provides her with the IP address linked to the Fake
Profile; [5] Eastlink has identified who the IP address belongs to; [6] AB is seeking
a court order to compel Eastlink to disclose the IP address to her; and [7] the court
has exercised its discretion to grant the order.140 The only information withheld
from the public, in other words, are [1] AB’s real name, and [2] the exact words
used by the cyber-perpetrator(s) on the Fake Profile.141 However, given the fre-
quency with which the news media reports on cyber-bullying cases involving
demeaning sexual terms directed at young girls, the hackneyed slurs likely aimed at
AB are hardly beyond the public’s imagination.142
The open court principle is grounded in the presumption that every court case
is a matter of public interest, whether it involves, hypothetically, the prime minister
of Canada under investigation for corruption, or, as in the case at hand, a 15-year-
old girl victimized by the sexualized content of a fake Facebook profile page in her
name. It is this presumption that lends itself to rebuttal in a digital context. AB’s
name, whatever it may be, is irrelevant; it neither adds nor takes away from the
accountability of judges in administering their duties in open court.143 The public
certainly has a justifiable interest in knowing the legal issues raised by AB v Bragg,
and its attending consequences for minors seeking to hold their cyber-perpetrators
accountable in court. Beyond such issues, however, the public’s interest in this case
cannot possibly extend as far as needing to know the name of AB and the sensitive
personal information that caused her harm.144 When there is no public interest in
disclosing the identity of a party, the judicial process does not mandate the full
disclosure of personal information.145
(d) Analysis
In 2011, the SCC granted leave to appeal the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s
140 Factum of the Appellant, above note 93 at para 114.
141 Ibid at para 115.
142 See, for instance, Jane Bailey & Mouna Hanna, “The Gendered Dimensions of Sexting:
Assessing the Applicability of Canada’s Child Pornography Provision” (2011)
CJWL./RFD 23 405; Clay Calvert, “Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amend-
ment: When Children Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines
the Law” (2009) 18 CommLaw Conspectus 1; Amanda Lenhart, “Teens and Sexting:
How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending Sexually Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude
Images Via Text Messaging,” Pew Internet and American Life Project (Washington:
Millennials, 2009), online: Pew Internet, http://www.pewinternet.
org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf.
143 Ibid.
144 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 15.
145 Bernier, supra note 43.
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decision in AB v Bragg.146 In fact, by the time our paper is published, the SCC will
have heard the appeal and will have had the opportunity, for the first time, to pro-
vide guidance on the balance that should be struck between openness and the rights
of children to anonymously sue their cyber-perpetrators in court without having to
subject themselves to further public scrutiny and humiliation.147 The second prong
of the Dagenais/Mentuck test serves as the barometer for engaging in this balancing
exercise; specifically, it mandates that courts engage in a principled and fair analy-
sis of the discrete values engaged by the facts of a case. In particular, the second
prong stipulates that a court consider whether or not the salutary effects of granting
a confidentiality order outweigh the “deleterious effects on the rights and interests
of the parties and the public,” including the effects on openness and the administra-
tion of justice.148
We submit that values superordinate to openness are triggered by the facts in
AB v Bragg and justify a court granting both of AB’s confidentiality requests,
namely, permission to advance the litigation anonymously, and a partial publication
ban of the content contained in the Fake Profile. More specifically, [1] the protec-
tion of children, [2] the right to privacy, and [3] access to justice are superordinate
social values that outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the
parties and public involved in this case.149 Furthermore, a nuanced and contextual-
ized analysis of the issues at bar indicate that both protection orders minimally
impair the openness of judicial proceedings.150 As will be demonstrated below, the
benefits of granting both orders to AB are transparently clear; the deleterious con-
sequences on the parties and the public resulting from such orders, by contrast, are
less obvious.151
(i) The Protection of Children
In many ways, children are sophisticated users of online technology.152 Unlike
their parents, today’s generation of youth can navigate through a barrage of online
tools and social communication networks as reflexively as they breathe. Accord-
ingly, today’s generation of youth is categorized as a population of “digital na-
tives”; for not only are they born into a world characterized by chronic connectiv-
ity, children today have trouble differentiating between their virtual and actual
existence.153 Despite their proficiency with the online world, children often fail to
146 AB (Litigation Guardian of) v Bragg Communications Inc (13 October 2011) 2011
CarswellNS 694 (SCC).
147 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 36.
148 Mentuck, supra note 96 at para 32.
149 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 96.
150 Ibid at para 99.
151 Ibid at para 98.
152 PW Agatston, R Kowalski & S Limber, “Students’ Perspectives on Cyber bullying”
(2007) 41(6) Journal of Adolescent Health 41 at 59-60.
153 Shariff & Churchill, supra note 29 at 275.
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understand the lasting repercussions of their online behaviour.154 More specifi-
cally, coupled with their physical, mental, and emotional immaturity, the online
world affords children with a level of independence that runs counter to their actual
developmental needs, namely, guidance and supervision when making decisions
that potentially impact others and themselves.155 The recognition of the inherent
vulnerability of children constitutes a primary objective of Canadian lawmakers; in
fact, this goal is repeatedly reaffirmed in all facets of this country’s law, including
its common law, legislation, and international commitments.156
Canada’s ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child [“Convention”] serves as one of the clearest indicators of the country’s rec-
ognition that children are deserving of a heightened form of legal protection.157 In
the context of cyber-bullying in general, and AB v Bragg in particular, article 3(1)
of the Convention bears repeating: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legis-
lative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.158
While the SCC has made clear that international norms are not binding on
Canada absent explicit legislative implementation, they are still considered to be
“relevant sources for interpreting rights domestically.”159 In light of this conclu-
sion, it is clear that, as per article 3(1) of the Convention, any decision affecting AB
should be made in her best interests. Furthermore, a child’s best interests include,
but are not limited to, ensuring that a child is “protected from harm, whether caused
by others or self-inflicted, and, importantly, seeking to foster the healthy develop-
ment of the child to adulthood.”160
In order to understand why the healthy development of AB to adulthood ne-
cessitates that both of her confidentiality requests be granted, it is imperative that
154 F Mishna, et al., “Cyber Bullying Behaviors Among Middle and High School Stu-
dents” (2010) 80(3) American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 362 at 362.
155 AK Liau, A Khoo, & PH Ang, “Parental Awareness and Monitoring of Adolescent
Internet Use” (2008) 27 Current Psychology 217 at 217.
156 Sharpe, supra note 121 at paras 170–174 (see for instance, s 163.1(4) of the Criminal
Code — the child pornography provision — which explicitly recognizes the vulnerabil-
ity of children: “Every person who possesses any child pornography is guilty of (a) an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and to
a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of forty-five days; or (b) an offence
punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
eighteen months and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of fourteen
days” RSC, 1985, C c-46).
157 United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can TS
1992 No 3 [Convention on the Rights of the Child].
158 Ibid at art 3(1) [Emphasis Added].
159 Sharpe, supra note 121 at para 175.
160 Ibid at para 174.
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we distinguish cyber-bullying from its more traditional predecessor.161 Without
question, cyber-bullying and traditional bullying share common attributes. For in-
stance, in both of its manifestations, the following characteristics are present: [1]
the harassment is unwanted and uninvited; [2] it is relentless; and [3] a victim is
singled out for the abuse.162 Furthermore, traditional and cyber-bullying are both
deeply rooted in societal attitudes of discrimination such as sexism, homophobia,
racism, and ableism; bullying behaviours, as such, are informed by ignorance, in-
tolerance and disrespect.163 Lastly, the dynamics of bullying are, without excep-
tion, the product of more than just the relationship between target and perpetrator;
instead, they mirror the ecological framework in which children operate, including
their peer groups, the classroom, and the community at large.164
Despite their commonalities, cyber-bullying is a different brand of abuse and
discrimination. Indeed, technology has forever changed the nature and scope of
bullying: 
[B]ullying may begin at school, but cyber-bullying follows you home and
into your bedroom; you can never feel safe, it is “non-stop bullying.” [. . .]
[C]yber-bullying is particularly insidious because it invades the home where
children feel safe, and it is constant and inescapable because victims can be
reached at all times and in all places.165
The above passage alludes to the main features that differentiate cyber-bully-
ing from traditional bullying. Specifically, the cyber-world provides perpetrators
with a vast and unsupervised virtual playground166 whereby instances of abuse can
[a] take place before an audience of infinite size, [b] result in the permanent publi-
cation of harmful expression, and [c] involve multiple and anonymous
instigators.167
(A) An Infinite Audience
Traditionally, unless onlookers/bystanders were physically present at the scene
of abuse — for instance, a school playground — they could not witness or partici-
pate in a bullying situation. Research on traditional bullying has found that 30% of
161 In this context, “traditional predecessor” refers to non-cyber related forms of abuse; for
instance, face-to-face schoolyard bullying would qualify as an instance of traditional
bullying.
162 Shaheen Shariff, Confronting Cyber-bullying: What Schools Need to Know to Control
Misconduct and Avoid Legal Consequences (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009) at 34 [Confronting Cyber-bullying].
163 Ibid at 22 (“Bullying behaviour expresses a dislike for others considered worthless,
inferior or undeserving of respect. From a sense of entitlement, intolerance toward dif-
ference and a sense of freedom to exclude and isolate those not worthy, bullies are able
to harm others without empathy, compassion or shame,” There’s No App for That,
supra note 23 at 9).
164 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 16.
165 Ibid at 11 [Emphasis Added].
166 Ibid at 12.
167 Confronting Cyber-bullying, supra note 162 at 44-45.
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onlookers/bystanders support perpetrators over targets of abuse;168 furthermore, the
longer it persists, the more onlookers/bystanders will join in on the abuse.169 On-
line tools, by contrast, level the playing field.170 In cyber-space, hundreds of perpe-
trators can get involved in the abuse, and classmates who may not otherwise en-
gage in bullying behaviours have the opportunity to do so with less chance of
getting caught.171 In a virtual playground, perpetrators, victims, and bystanders are
often interchangeable; yesterday’s victim can be tomorrow’s perpetrator.172
(B) Permanence of Expression
Traditional bullying, more often than not, takes place in secluded locations,
including washrooms and school buses, where hurtful forms of expression are
ephemerally attached to victims. More specifically, if a perpetrator calls his or her
victim demeaning sexual slurs in a hallway, those words do not escape that location
unless shared by word of mouth. Internet communications, by contrast, are more
permanent in nature. E-mails and defamatory material or modified photographs of a
person are extremely difficult to remove after being posted online because millions
of people can immediately download, save, retrieve, forward and re-post that mate-
rial again.173 In short, “the extraordinary capacity of the Internet to replicate almost
endlessly any defamatory message lends credence to the notion that ‘the truth
rarely catches up with a lie.’”174
(C) Anonymity
The traditional bullying relationship is characterized by a power imbalance
between the individual who bullies and the individual who is victimized. This
asymmetry in power can result from a myriad of victim-characteristics, including
size, age, physical strength, popularity, membership in a marginalized group, or
168 C Salmivalli, “Group View on Victimization: Empirical Findings and their Implica-
tions” in J Juvonen & S Graham (eds) Peer Harassment in School: The Plight of the
Vulnerable and the Victimized (New York: Guilford Press, 2001) at 398–419.
169 NR Henderson, et al., “Bullying as a Normal Part of School Life: Early Adolescents’
Perspectives on Bullying & Peer Harassment” (Paper Presentation at the Safe Schools
Safe Communities Conference, Vancouver, BC, June 2002).
170 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 8.
171 Confronting Cyber-bullying, supra note 162 at 44 (Consider, for instance, the case of
Ghyslain Reza, a Quebec teenager from Trois-Rivières. After Reza taped himself play-
ing a character from Star Wars with a sabre in hand, he became known worldwide as
the “Star Wars Kid.” Reza accidentally left his video in a media room at school.
Shortly thereafter, the video was found and stolen by two classmates and uploaded onto
a website. The site received over 15 million hits and more than 106 copies of the video
were made. In fact, “Star Wars Kid” memorabilia were manufactured. Reza’s parents
settled out of court with the two students who stole the video. However, Reza still had
to switch schools and endure months of harassment).
172 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 8 (As one Grade 11 student observed, “Any-
one can be a cyber-[perpetrator]; even someone small can pick on someone big”).
173 Confronting Cyber-bullying, supra note 162 at 44.
174 Lidsky, supra note 66.
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other known vulnerabilities.175 Cyber-bullying, however, removes this traditional
requirement for a power imbalance between perpetrator and victim. In the cyber-
realm, most perpetrators are anonymous.176 Shielded by screen names and untrace-
able IP addresses, cyber-perpetrators can inflict harm without revealing their identi-
ties and irrespective of their ascribed characteristics or status in school. Inflicting
harm online is often accompanied with zero sense of consequence or impact; in-
stead, it perpetuates cyber-bullying. Senders of electronic taunts or hate mail never
have to see the reaction of their targeted recipients; consequently, online perpetra-
tors are comfortably oblivious to the hurt they have caused.177
(ii) The Right to Privacy
Like the protection of children, the right to privacy is a fundamental social
value echoed in multiple legal instruments in Canada, including the Charter, the
common law, and through various statutory enactments.178 The right to privacy is
of primordial importance for all Canadians; for children, however, the constitu-
tional dimensions of this right represent recognition on behalf of lawmakers that
childhood, in and of itself, is entitled to special care and assistance.179 Accordingly,
this cognizance is made evident through a series of legislative provisions that man-
date anonymity for children in legal proceedings where a child’s identity would
otherwise be exposed.180 In fact, Canada’s commitment to protecting the privacy
rights of children is codified in law. For instance, the Preamble of the Youth Crimi-
nal Justice Act explicitly recognizes Canada’s ratification of the Convention; and,
for the purposes of privacy rights, article 16 of the Convention is particularly of
critical importance: “No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his or her honour and reputation.”181
The potentially devastating consequences of stigmatizing children with life-
long labels cannot be understated. In addition to impairing a child’s developing
sense of self-image and self-worth, attaching children with uninvited labels often
175 D Pepler, et al., “Girls Who Bully: A Developmental and Relational Perspective” in M
Putallaz & KL Bierman (eds) Aggression, Antisocial Behavior, and Violence Among
Girls: A Developmental Perspective. Duke Series in Child Development and Public
Policy (New York: Guildford Publications, 2004) at 90–109.
176 Confronting Cyber-bullying, supra note 162 at 44.
177 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 12.
178 Section 7 of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the princi-
ples of fundamental justice,” Charter, supra note 99.
179 R v Fox, [2002] OJ No 3548, ¶75 (CJ).
180 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 4 (“[O]ur justice systems are increasingly concerned with
protecting children from the harmful consequences of publicizing child welfare hear-
ings, custody battles and criminal proceedings involving young offenders.” See, for
instance, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 2; and s. 94 of the Children and
Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5).
181 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 157 at art 16(1) [Emphasis Added].
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represents an invasion of privacy that can never be repaired or restored: 
Although it may appear trite to say so, [. . .] when a private document or
record is revealed and the reasonable expectation of privacy therein is
thereby displaced, the invasion is not with respect to the particular docu-
ment or record in question. Rather, it is an invasion of the dignity and self-
worth of the individual, who enjoys the right to privacy as an essential as-
pect of his or her liberty in a free and democratic society.182
In the context of electronic records, the above passage is especially revealing.
For a majority of digital natives, their online reputations constitute a primary ba-
rometer for measuring their self-identity. This is a time in a child’s life when his or
her reputation among peers is of utmost importance; consequently, the slightest in-
sult, jab, or derogatory statement can result in extreme feelings of shame and hu-
miliation. Furthermore, such feelings of self-loathing are exacerbated and magni-
fied as the offensive peer group increases in size.183 In a digital era where an
arsenal of technologies can potentially inflict social cruelty, children are especially
in need of a judicial system that will help preserve — not erode — their dignity and
self-worth.184 Put in another way, in 2012, it is easier to conceive of privacy as an
ally, not an opponent, of openness in protecting the administration of justice.185
(iii) Access to Justice
According to Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, the most advanced judicial
system in the world is a failure if it does not provide justice to the people it is
meant to serve.186 Without question, children constitute a group of people in need
of the court’s support and protection.187 As the evidence currently stands before the
SCC, however, one such child’s access is conditionally based on the court award-
ing her confidentiality protection. More specifically, AB submitted to the SCC that,
absent anonymity being granted to her, she would not proceed with her application
and, as a result, would be unable to use the order granted to her at trial compelling
Eastlink to disclose the identity of her cyber-perpetrator. The Court of Appeal ex-
plained to AB that, by choosing to defend her reputation in court, she would
unexceptionally be subjected to the public scrutiny that attaches to civil litigation,
including the disclosure of personal and potentially embarrassing details.188 The
Court of Appeal, in other words, left AB with a Hobson’s choice: AB can either sue
under her real name and forever be linked with the impugned Fake Profile in this
case or not pursue her action at all, thus never having an opportunity to seek justice
182 R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411 at para 119 [O’Connor].
183 Shariff & Johnny, supra note 9 at 308.
184 Ibid at 309.
185 Eltis, supra note 8 at 27.
186 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, “Judges of the Court” (Remarks delivered
to the Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, 8 March 2007), online:
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe-dis/bm07-03-08-eng.asp>.
187 Supra note 158.
188 AB v Bragg, supra note 19 at para 83.
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against her cyber-perpetrator.189
As soon as a litigant is deterred from seeking justice in court in fear of being
subjected to media scrutiny and further bullying the underlying principles of open-
ness are undermined. The open court principle is not an end in itself; rather, it is a
means of promoting the rule of law and the administration of justice.190 Openness
may yield, consequently, when the fundamental objective that it serves, namely,
preserving the integrity of the administration of justice, so requires.191 In cases
such as AB v Bragg, privacy acts as a way of safeguarding against bringing the
administration of justice into disrepute.192 Indeed, a willingness to participate in a
justice system is a marker of a healthy legal institution; as soon as openness over-
powers justice by deterring litigants from accessing the courts, however, the princi-
ple no longer operates in favour of its underlying values.193
In summary, the protection of children, the right to privacy, and access to jus-
tice are all superordinate social values in AB v Bragg that trump openness. The
salutary benefits of granting AB the partial publication ban and anonymity order
are clear. If AB is permitted to advance the litigation under pseudonymous initials,
she can avoid further public scrutiny by the media and her peers. Furthermore, she
can safeguard her emotional health by severing the Fake Profile — and its accom-
panying sexualized language regarding her allegedly preferred sexual positions and
acts — from her identity, thus ensuring that she can grow up absent the label of
“victim of cyber-bullying.”194 The public has an interest in granting AB’s confi-
dentiality requests. As the evidence currently stands before the SCC, AB will not
defend her reputation in court without such protection. The name of a target of
cyber-bullying cannot possibly be of more public interest than seeing that victim
access the courts and hold her perpetrator accountable for the harm suffered. Rather
than give AB a Hobson’s choice, the court should prioritize providing her with
options on how to protect and shield her developing sense of dignity and self-
worth.195
III. A WAY FORWARD: FOSTERING A POPULATION OF
YOUNG DIGITAL CITIZENS
Fact patterns such as the one presented in AB v Bragg are unfortunately unex-
ceptional in the modern era of digital technologies. Today, it seems as though one
cannot turn on the television or read a newspaper without a new case of cyber-
bullying being reported.196 Sadly, the publicized incidents only represent the tip of
189 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 93.
190 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 11.
191 Ibid.
192 Eltis, supra note 8 at 27.
193 McLachlin, supra note 6 at 11.
194 Factum of the Appellant, supra note 93 at para 98.
195 O’Connor, supra note 182.
196 See, for instance, CBC News, “Halifax Teen Speaks against Facebook Bully” CBC
News (27 April 2012), online: CBCnews <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-sco-
tia/story/2012/04/27/ns-facebook-bully.html>; Dorie Turner & Greg Bluestein,
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the iceberg; for every case of cyber-bullying mentioned in the media, another one
slips through the cracks of cyberspace as a vast majority of incidents go unre-
ported.197 Cases such as AB v Bragg raise much needed awareness on the issue of
cyber-bullying. Maintaining a spotlight on the issue, however, does not necessarily
equate with assuaging the devastating consequences of the practice, nor does it ex-
pose the underlying roots of the problem. Indeed, research now confirms that bully-
ing behaviours are not effectively eliminated by haphazard, case-by-case interven-
tions.198 Accordingly, court actions will not prove to be the ultimate panacea for a
complex and multifaceted issue such as cyber-bullying — a reality that begs an ob-
vious question, namely, what will?
In the following section, we will demonstrate why litigious efforts against in-
dividual perpetrators of harm will not eradicate the problem of cyber-bullying. We
will do so by considering how [1] technology has changed the way people interact,
and [2] children need to be taught about rights, responsibilities, and relationships
both on and offline; digital natives, in other words, need to learn how to become
socially responsible digital citizens.199
(a) Embracing Technology, Escaping Relationships
On March 16, 2012, Dharun Ravi — a former Rutgers university student ac-
cused of spying on and intimidating his gay roommate, Tyler Clementi, by use of a
hidden webcam — was found guilty on all criminal counts, including privacy inva-
sion, tampering with evidence, and bias intimidation.200 News headlines around the
world were quick to praise the jury verdict, celebrating the decision as a symbol for
an end to cyber-bullying.201 Reflexively, the conviction felt right. Indeed, while
Ravi was not officially charged with causing Clementi’s death, his suicide was
ubiquitously present in the courtroom and in media reports on the case.202 Upon
“Facebook Bullies Slapped with Libel Lawsuit by 14-year-old Schoolgirl” The Star (27
April 2012), online: thestar <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1169189 —
facebook-bullies-slapped-with-libel-lawsuit-by-14-year-old-schoolgirl>; Danah Boyd
& John Palfrey, “Stop the Cycle of Bullying” The Huffington Post (23 February 2012),
online: Huff Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danah-boyd/dharun-ravi-
jury_b_1298354.html>.
197 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 11.
198 Jamison Barr & Emmy Lugus, “Digital Threats on Campus: Examining the Duty of
Colleges to Protect Their Social Networking Students” (2011) 33 W New Eng L Rev
757 at 773.
199 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 16.
200 David Ariosto, “Guilty Verdict in Rutgers Webcam Spying Case” CNN (17 March
2002), online: CNNJustice <http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/16/justice/new-jersey-
rutgers-trial/index.html>.




202 Rosa Prince, “Tyler Clementi Case: Students ‘Freaked Out’ After Spying on Gay
Roommate with Webcam” The Telegraph (27 February 2012), online: The Telegraph
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deeper reflection, however, this conviction is more troubling than it is justice-serv-
ing. More specifically, while the evidence might have been sufficient to convince a
jury of Ravi’s guilt with respect to the particular charges at bar, it is premature to
attribute any symbolic outcomes to this trial above and beyond the specific facts
therein. As danah boyd persuasively argues in a reflection piece on the case, this
verdict will not rid the world of cyber-bullying; instead, it will merely ruin the life
of another human being: 
This case is being hailed for its symbolism, but what is the message that it
conveys? It says that a brown kid who never intended to hurt anyone be-
cause of their sexuality will do jail time, while politicians and pundits who
espouse hatred on TV and radio and in stump speeches continue to be cele-
brated. [. . .] No teen that I know identifies their punking and pranking of
their friends and classmates as bullying, let alone bias intimidation. Sending
Ravi to jail will do nothing to end bullying. Yet, it lets people feel like it
will and that makes me really sad.203
The above passage alludes to a fundamental contributing factor of cyber-bul-
lying at all levels of society; specifically, in our rush to embrace technology, we
have diminished the value we place on healthy and considerate relationships, thus
eroding our sense of respect and responsibility towards others.204 Put in another
way, we have created a world filled with obstacles to making real-life human con-
nections, including no-touch policies in school, excessive screen time, and conver-
sations mediated through text messages and iChat.205 When children are prevented
from having high quality and positive human relationships, they cannot experience
diversity, nor can they develop a fundamental skill of emotional competence,
namely, empathy. Bullying, in all of its manifestations, is rooted in a “dislike for
others considered worthless, inferior or undeserving of respect;”206 and the In-
ternet, for instance, with its protected screen names and vast virtual playground, has




(“Eighteen-year-old [Clementi] killed himself days after learning from social media
sites that he had been seen in an intimate embrace in the room he shared at Rutgers
University with [Ravi]. Molly Wei, another Rutgers student who was watching the
webcam with Ravi when they glimpsed two seconds of Clementi and an unnamed
guest “making out,” told Middlesex County Courthouse they had not expected to see
any sexual acts when they turned the camera on”).
203 boyd, supra note 201 (By “brown kid,” boyd is referring to Ravi’s ethnic origins; spe-
cifically, he is Indian).
204 There’s No App for That, supra note 23 at 7.
205 Ibid at 9 (At the extreme end of the spectrum, schools have introduced policies banning
children from having a best friend. For instance, in the UK, students are encouraged to
play in large groups in order to avoid the emotional fall-out of losing a best friend,
Harry Hawkins, “Schools Ban Children Making Best Friends” (19 March 2012) The
Sun, online: The Sun <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4203460/Schools-
ban-children-making-best-friends.html>).
206 Ibid.
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Consciously or not, children are affected by their world saturated with graphic
violence, aggression, and meanness disguised as humour.207 Denigrating and in-
sulting cyber-remarks are so commonplace today that they no longer register as
remarkable; instead, they reflect a societal threshold for normalcy and acceptabil-
ity.208 In fact, when a malicious comment does clearly cross the line, many teens
do not recognize the incident as cyber-bullying; instead they disregard the situation
entirely and characterize it as nothing more than digital drama.209 While cruelty
can often be disguised as humour, the repercussions of online bullying are anything
but funny.210 Research now confirms that virtual threats are often perceived by
victims as being as real as face-to-face confrontations.211 Furthermore, misogynis-
tic comments, including uninvited sexual harassment and sexual coercion, are rated
as being more threatening and harassing when they are posted online.212 In short,
the growing problem of cyber-bullying, coupled with a diluted compassion for the
pain caused to others, is indicative of an underlying societal illness that needs to be
treated.213
(b) From Digital Natives to Digital Citizens
Researchers have established that the teaching of social and emotional skills
and competencies is of fundamental importance when educating children about
how to engage in positive and constructive human relationships.214 In the current
social climate, “the evidence of bullying shows that many children may not be
learning the skills and competencies necessary to engage positively and construc-
tively in human relationships.”215 Instead, children demonstrate an uncanny capac-
ity to inflict harm on others with no remorse or understanding of the consequences
of their actions. Children who bully online do so because cyberspace provides a
virtual playground to act on their powerful emotions; many cyber-perpetrators
choose to behave destructively online because they would never act that way in
person. Put in another way, in the virtual realm, children feel as though they are
freed from the shackles of adult supervision and rules; they can inflict pain without
getting caught, and more disturbingly, without caring about it.216
For digital natives, participation in a virtual realm consisting of social net-
207 Ibid at 14.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid at 14.
210 Supra note 27.
211 Shariff & Johnny, supra note 9 at 315.
212 Biber et al., as cited in Jack Glaser & Kimberly Kahn, “Prejudice, Discrimination, and
the Internet” in Y. Amichai-Hamburger (ed) The Social Net: Human Behaviour in
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works and informational tools will characterize their existence from the cradle to
the grave.217 Consequently, adult-stakeholders, including parents, teachers, and law
enforcement, must work with children to help develop their ethical compass for
human decency with respect to their cyber-behaviours. More specifically, children
must be instilled with an emotional skill set that will help them recognize the limits
and the differences between online fun and entertainment versus cruelty at the ex-
pense of others.218 The underbelly of the technology beast is dark.219 As such, it is
tempting to blame technology for the insidious and pervasive nature of cyber-bully-
ing today; in truth, however, you can never blame the medium — it is always the
message. And the message that needs to be relayed to children, for instance, is as
follows: our duty to behave as responsible citizens transcends physical reality; digi-
tal citizenship consists of the same rights and responsibilities that govern human
behaviour in realtime and face-to-face.
CONCLUSION
In the Elizabethan era, local constituents got their requisite fix of drama
through the open court principle and its accompanying right of access to observe
legal cases as they unfolded before judges.220 In the digital era of today, by con-
trast, a new category of drama has emerged from which citizens can observe the
trials and tribulations of their time. More specifically, cyber-drama in general, and
cyber-bullying in particular, has placed before our courts novel legal questions
never before anticipated by the original codifiers of fundamental rules of law, in-
cluding the right of the public to open civil proceedings.221 AB v Bragg stands for
the principle that, absent evolution, the constitutional dimensions of openness will
fail to protect those most in need of protection.222 Indeed, as soon as children are
deterred from accessing the courts in fear of the public scrutiny and harm attached
to the disclosure of judicial information, the open court principle no longer operates
in favour of its underlying objectives, namely, promoting the rule of law and the
integrity of the administration of justice.223 It is time to eradicate the hierarchical
approach to rights. Rather than presumptively placing more weight on one right
over another, courts should instead engage in more nuanced analyses which focus
on how values can work together to protect the most vulnerable populations in our
country.224
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